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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to model the interaction between the targets of the current 
CAP: environmental adaptation, subsidies and efficiency of the animal farming. To study 
these questions at the European level, we chose Spain and Germany as representatives of 
Continental and Mediterranean livestock raising, in particular a sample data from 1999 to 
2000, and we identify the production frontier and relative efficiency level for each animal 
oriented farm. The production frontier and efficiency index for each type of farm (assuming 
no specific production functions) are identified using DEA techniques. We then address the 
relationship between relative efficiency, farm size and environmentally friendly behavior 
realizing a non parametric regression of efficiency on economic size, a proxy for the degree 
of environmental appropriateness, and regional dummies. Calculations of the efficiency of 
the farms including direct subsidies are compared with the counterfactual exercise in the 
case where direct subsidies are not considered. Finally, we look for relations between 
subsidies and factors such as farm size, efficiency and environmentally friendly behavior. 
One key result shows that on average direct payments generally tend to increase efficiency. 
However, in most of the cases the mean efficiency decreases as the percentage of direct 
payments rises. Direct payments are found to be positively related to environmentally 
friendly production, at least in Germany. However, in general, the direct payment system is 
not sufficient to offset the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms as well as the 
larger ones are more efficient.1   
 
Keywords: Efficiency, subsidies, DEA, non-parametric regression, environmental friendly 
farming, natural resources. 
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1. Motivation and Organization 
 
Environmental adaptation and efficiency have become key issues in new European 
agricultural policy. The recent animal epidemics (e.g., mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth 
disease, bird influence) and consumer reactions have drawn attention to the need for 
environmental adaptation of animal husbandry. The agreement of the Council of Ministers 
in June 2003 (Mid-Term Review of the Common Agricultural Politic [CAP MTR]), means 
a step towards the decoupling of income from prices. Additionally, CAP MTR introduces a 
modulation of the direct payment (e.g., limiting direct payments by size).2  Decoupled aid 
means that in the future, the vast majority of subsidies will be paid independently of the 
volume of production. According to the Commission, the key elements of the new reformed 
CAP are, in a nutshell: 
• a single farm payment to be made to EU farmers, independent of production; limited 
coupled elements may be maintained to avoid abandonment of production,  
• this payment will be linked to respect for environmental, food safety, animal and plant 
health and animal welfare standards, as well as the requirement to keep all farmland in 
good agricultural and environmental condition (“cross-compliance”),  
• a strengthened rural development policy using more EU budget,  
• a reduction in direct payments (“modulation”) for lager farms to increase the budget for 
the new rural development policy. 
In the WTO negotiations millennium round the exporting countries of the Cairns group 
asked for the total abolition of the agricultural subsidies.  The Commission has successfully 
argued for multi-functionality to maintain or even increase direct payments when reducing 
intervention prices in the WTO negotiations. This approach should provide a tool for 
promoting environmentally friendly practices in agriculture.3 
Another perspective is that supporters of direct payments argue that this tool is used to 
increase the efficiency of farms with structural problems. Critics argue that subsidies allow 
farmers to continue producing below the efficiency frontier. Some critics, especially from 
outside the EU, also argue that by allowing inefficient European farmers to survive, the 
CAP harms efficient agriculture overseas. One of the main justifications for the direct 
payments to farmers is their positive societal impact through nature and environmental 
conservation and increased efficiency. Direct payments are defined as subsidies decoupled 
(not linked to) from the output level. Surprisingly few studies are available which calculate 
whether the 1992 CAP reform increases in the level of direct payments were followed by a 
                                                 
2Commissioner Fischler, the European Commission staff member responsible for Agriculture, 
Rural, Development and Fisheries, remarked (SPEECH/03/326): ``The agriculture reform has been 
agreed.  ... Farmers will enjoy more income stability, more freedom to produce what the market 
wants, and a system of support which is much easier to justify from a social point of view. 
Consumers and taxpayers will receive more for their money: more transparency, more quality, more 
environmental protection and animal welfare". 
3E.g. in Spain, animal farms with extensive practices (i.e. low livestock units per land area), 
frequently located in mountainous areas or Mediterranean forest grazing lands, well illustrate the 
complementary relationship between animal farming and landscape preservation. 
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rise in efficiency, especially for the environmentally friendly farms. This could actually 
politically justify the reinforcement of the status quo with minor changes. Fischler, on the 
other hand, argued that EU farmers will become more competitive by increasing their 
efficiency: “Severing the link between subsidies and production will make EU farmers 
more competitive and market orientated”. Certainly, see Álvarez (2001), efficiency does 
not automatically imply that farms are competitive. However, at least empirically, 
strengthened market orientation does not always correlate clearly with environmental 
conservation. 
The aim of this paper is the analysis of this triangular relation between efficiency, 
environmental friendliness and subsidies in the EU. More specific, we try to find some 
answers on the following chain of question. 
First, it is still costly to be environmental friendly in the EU? Note that answering this 
question is a rather complex task due to endogenity problems and because the notion of 
efficiency is ambiguous; it could mean economic efficiency from the farmer's point of view 
(e.g. including direct payments) or conventional technical efficiency (looking at the 
production process without subsidies). 
The second question is: How much do subsidies compensate small and environmental 
friendly farms? More specifically we can study how much they improve compared to the 
large environmentally unfriendly farms after, rather than before subsidies. This is 
equivalent to revealing the impact of the direct payment system on farm efficiency under 
the farmer's status quo behavior. 
So, to answer these questions we propose basically three steps: 
In the first step, efficiency is calculated taking into account the direct payment (DP)   
received, calling this coefficient  DPE  . Direct payments are defined as subsidies not directly 
linked to the output level. In other words, the farmer has to take decisions having in mind 
that, within the farm possibilities of production, certain outputs include byproducts 
(positive environmental externalities) with a direct payment as a monetary compensation 
whereas others have no compensation or even a cost (environmental tax for a negative 
externalities). 
Afterwards, efficiency is computed excluding direct payments, calling this coefficient  WE  . 
The results rank farms according with the efficiency in a world without direct subsidies, so 
neither rewards for positive externalities nor penalties for negative externalities. It might be 
mentioned that the  WE   calculation assumes the existing input/output prices (i.e. coupled 
support levels remain unchanged). For example, the efficiency impact of an hypothetical 
variation of the intervention prices are (by intention) not considered in this exercise4. It may 
be emphasized that we indeed want to compare the efficiency with vs without DP under the 
farmer's “status quo” behavior. 
In other words we want to measure the loss / gain of economic (i.e. monetary) efficiency 
for being environmentally friendly. We always refer to DPE  when speaking of economic 
efficiency, and to WE  when speaking of conventional efficiency. But note that the 
calculation of WE , DPE  is not of direct interest in our paper but serves as an auxiliary step. 
After having calculated DPE , WE , we regress efficiency on environmentally friendly (EF), 
                                                 
4 The Analysis of the effect of intervention price changes for Spain when it joined the EU has been 
addressed by Mora R. and San Juan C. (2004). 
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and on other factors like economic size (ESU) to get rid of possible endogenity. We find 
that in general, being environmental friendly and/or small is costly, especially when 
looking on  WE  . Also we find strong positive interaction between size and environmental 
unfriendliness. This might not be surprising, but now we can look on what the European 
Union was really doing against this (the “cross-compliance” argument). 
When recalling the second question it is clear that all we have to do is to take the regression 
curves from the above and compare the regression of  WE  with the regression of DPE , i.e. 
for the statistical part of this analysis we need the same steps as we need to answer the first 
above mentioned question. 
Note that in this counterfactual exercise we study how efficient the farms would be under 
the same allocation policy but without receiving DP. This point is important to understand 
because we are not interested in measuring the efficiency (without DP) after farms have 
adapted to the new situation, e.g. having become less environmental friendly or increased 
farm size etc. Such a study would be interesting when looking at competitiveness but is 
clearly beyond of the scope of this paper. 
Next, the third question deals with the issue of promoting conventional efficiency, WE , 
using direct payments. The question to answer is: Do the subsidies (at least) promote 
conventional efficiency? Investigating this is fairly simple because due to the way we have 
calculated  WE , there is no problem of endogenity when looking at the linear and semi-log-
linear regression (i.e. correlation and semi-log-correlation) of  WE  on DP  .  
This produces our fourth and final question: How are the  DP   related to size  ESU ? Here 
we have simply looked at different linear and log-linear relationships between DP  and  
ESU . We belief that this is fair enough in our context as we are not interested in the 
intentions of the European Community (as then one would have to take into account the 
possible endogenity of  ESU ). Moreover we are interested in the absolute (direct, indirect 
or spurious) relation between  DP   and  ESU . We find that this relation is up to 97% which 
leads us to conclude that this subsidy policy is counterproductive. That correlation is not 
surprising as “decoupled subsidies” in terms of direct payments are mainly based on “per 
head” and “per hectare”, but not exclusively, and therefore the strength of positive 
correlation is surprising. 
To study these questions at the European level, we chose Spain and Germany as 
representatives of Continental and Mediterranean livestock raising. The paper aims to 
replicate efficiency levels under different policy scenarios. We use the German and the 
Spanish sample data from the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) from 1999 and 
2000 by type of animal farming with positive plant production. Note that more recent data, 
though available, are strongly disturbed by the BSE (also called mad cows) crisis. We 
repeat efficiency calculations for two years to test for the influence of random weather 
variability (e.g., pasture availability). 
For our analysis we always use nonparametric methods when parametric model (mis-
)specification could provoke serious disturbances in our conclusions. When we speak of 
model (mis-)specification we do not refer to variable selection but to functional form 
specification. This greatly increases the econometric effort as well as the variance of our 
results but avoids any problems of model specification. 
Efficiency is measured using an index calculated with DEA (Data Envelope Analysis), and 
with a counterfactual index ignoring the direct payments for each individual farm (for 
details see Section 3.1). The counterfactual index measures the level of efficiency distortion 
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on the economic behavior of the holding because under CAP it is possible to “crop 
subsidies” on the top of agricultural products. This allows us to compare relative efficiency 
with direct subsidies included in the efficiency index to the case when they are eliminated 
in the so called counterfactual efficiency calculations. From the above discussion one might 
already see that in both cases, WE  and DPE  will have to be calculated as what in the classical 
DEA literature is called “technical efficiency” but with all variables measured in monetary 
units. We are not speaking of efficiency as the product of allocative times technical 
efficiency (in physical units) as often done in DEA literature.For more details see Section 3. 
As far as we know a similar methodology taking into account the level of environmental 
adaptation of the farms has not been used to address the question of the subsidies efficiency 
effects under the CAP integration. The available papers mainly study efficiency related to 
other variables (size, techniques of feeding, location, …) or try to apprise environmental 
adaptation without relating with the efficiency. Most paper just compare the profitability of 
“ecological” versus conventional. So in these sense our paper is original in the field of the 
policy evaluation of the CAP. The implications are important for the future application of 
the recently approved CAP Reform 2003 on historical basis. Results can potentially be 
translated into promoting the wrong type of farming, as in past years, e.g., the conversion of 
price support into direct payments based on the past year's level of protection (the 
“historical rights” argument). 
 
2. Model and Data 
 
The DPs were originally introduced in the McSharry CAP reform to decouple income from 
guarantee prices, and to control the intervention stocks. The theoretical idea behind the 
introduction of direct payments is the anti-production premium which assumes that the 
farm income is decoupling of price- and income policy. This premium should be related 
with the income loss due to the output reduction. In practice direct payments were fixed by 
area, by head of certain animal and others. This means that in a common market 
organization with overproduction the Commission typically calculates the DP to 
compensate farmers for an income reduction. That policy can be reinforced through the 
reduction of the guarantee prices (e.g. reducing the intervention price to approach world 
market prices) with the target being to eliminate intervention stocks and to control the CAP 
budget by reducing intervention acquisitions and /or export restitutions (subsidies). In fact, 
the total elimination of the export restitutions is under negotiation in the current millennium 
round of the WTO (World Trade Organization). The Commission is also seeking to 
transform every direct payment into single farm payments. 
In practice, the real impact of guarantee price reductions on farm income depends on the 
level of efficiency of the farm with respect to the standard level imputed by the policy 
makers in the regions. Therefore, the policy measure (i.e. direct payment) is calculated 
mainly based on the set-aside area and / or the number of heads per holding. On top of that, 
the cross compliance criterion requires a minimum area per head (of cattle) to qualify for a 
direct payments program. For this reason our environmentally friendly proxy is livestock 
unit equivalents per agricultural utilized area (LU/UAA) as we want to replicate the policy 
makers criteria. 
The econometric task is to assess the impact of being environmentally friendly on being 
efficient, and to determine the relations between direct payments and other factors such as 
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farm economic size, environmentally friendly behavior and economic efficiency. Under 
price intervention it is difficult to assume that marginal costs equal prices as often required 
in parametric production functions for inputs and outputs (i.e. under perfect competition), 
even in the most flexible specifications. Further, we prefer not to use specific 
parametrization for our models, i.e. neither for the production function when calculating 
efficiency nor for the regression when estimating the effect of size and environmental 
friendliness on efficiency.5 
Therefore we have decided to apply rather sophisticated nonparametric methods as 
otherwise, the modelings would clearly have a direct impact on the results. Certainly, it is 
well known that this, at least for moderate sample sizes, greatly complicates precise 
inference (e.g. significance testing). On the other hand, the results we see are uncorrupted 
in the sense that they do not vary with the subjective model the researcher has chosen. 
The producer level of direct support is measured by the total amount of direct payments in 
farm accounts; size by European Size Units (ESU), and livestock unit equivalents per 
agricultural utilized area (LU/UAA) as a proxy for measuring how environmentally 
friendly the farm is, see discussion above. In contrast, the output efficiency cannot be 
directly observed and will have to be calculated in a first step by DEA, see also Section 3.1. 
Our variables to calculate efficiency of production are the following6: 
 
OUTPUT  Qv   crop output 
  Qa   animal output 
INPUT  Kf   farm capital, mainly buildings and machinery at
present value 
  Ca   fodder and other animal linked inputs 
  Cv   crop linked inputs (fertilizer, agro-chemicals, seeds, 
water 
  and other crop specific inputs, fuels and lubricants) 
 W wages 
 
I NI
UAA
A A
=
+    
Utilized Agricultural Area of farm aggregate
adjusted by quality (including pasture, arable land
and permanent crops adjusted by quality, i.e.
geographical 
 SP “shadow price” / opportunity costs 
  for producing in a non-subsidized way 
 
The livestock is considered in the farmer's output because output is defined here by stock 
                                                 
5As a referee noticed, the effect of size on efficiency could also be studied by other methods, e.g. 
though the measurement of scale efficiency, see Førsund (1996) or Banker, Cooper, Seiford, and 
Zhu (2004). 
6We always have used nominal prices and real quantities accounted by the farmers as given in 
FADN. It could be discussed to use world market prices instead, but 1. it is very difficult to 
calculate new output and input levels for each individual farm under world market conditions. 
Therefore efficiency measures would be biased by assumptions on world market prices. 2. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to study the efficiency under different trade liberalization scenarios. 
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variation and sales, for details see MCKay, Lawrence, and Vlastuin (1983). In total, five 
inputs can be used plus SP. The so called “shadow price” (SP) is calculated from direct 
payments (including premiums) with a negative sign, therefore we set SP = -DP. 
The present value of fK  is calculated in base of the acquisition price and inputting a 
technical amortization by average life of every type of asset (building or machinery and 
transport vehicles, for details see Ball et al., 2004). This excludes the livestock units and the 
land area. 
When we say “adjusted by quality”, this means that we have calculated the value of input 
“land” for Spain as follows:  
land value , (1)= ∗ + ∗I I NI NIA P A P  
 where IA : Agricultural Utilized Area (UAA) irrigated (Ha.); NIA : UAA non-irrigated 
(Ha.); IP : price UAA irrigated by region (Euros/Ha); NIP : price UAA non-irrigated by 
region (Euros/Ha). The average price by region is a weighted average of the irrigated and 
non irrigated different type of lands in the region (e.g. grass land divided in two quality 
levels, plus arable land, greenhouses, permanent crops (by type of tree: fruits other than 
citruses, citruses, vinegars, olive) see for details Decimavilla and San Juan (2002). For 
Germany we took the total of UAA as the differentiation of irrigated and non irrigated land 
does not make much sense.7 
Having the efficiency at hand, we use a regression model to study the level of compatibility 
between different targets of the new CAP, including environmental conservation and 
competitiveness at the farm level. 
We want to measure the impact of being environmentally friendly by filtering out the 
regional and size effects. As indicated before the increase in consumer demand for more 
environmentally friendly products on the one hand, and the justification of the incentives 
paid under CAP on the other hand, have made “being environmentally friendly” an 
important issue of output efficiency. 
Beyond the objective of more market oriented agriculture, the new CAP uses efficiency as 
a key factor. Therefore we estimated the following model [in EUR]  
TE g[ln(EF),ln(ESU)] R e, (2)β= + +  
 where  E   is efficiency,  EF   indicates the environmentally friendly degree proxy measure,  
ESU   is the European Size Unit, and R  is a vector of dummy variables for agricultural 
regions divided in to North, Center, Northeast, South and East for Spain, and North, Center, 
South and East for Germany respectively. Farm location is reported at a general agricultural 
regional level, a geographical unit that includes several provinces (in Spain) or Länder (in 
Germany). Therefore, in the non-parametric model we use location parameters to control 
for possible different regional endowments. The aggregation by large agrarian regions of 
Spain is based on the geographical specialization reported by Mora and San Juan (2003). 
The aggregation of the LU is made with the standard procedure used by FADN and 
                                                 
7There are three things that might cause curiosity: why we do not aggregate the two outputs, why 
we include SP as input instead of considering DP as a third output, and why we have not aggregated 
more (or less) on the input side. The reasoning for this comes immediately from the DEA method so 
we have postponed this discussion until the end of Section sec-dea. 
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EUROSTAT. The variables come from the individual accounting collected under FADN 
normalization. The detailed input and output information of each farm account is fully 
utilized to calculate the aggregate variables that include all production costs. 
The function 2g : ℜ →ℜ  is not specified further because the impact of ln(EF)  and  
ln(ESU)  turned out to be nonlinear and to have (strong) interaction. Finally, the “error” term 
e  stands for the not further specified heterogeneity. As g( , )⋅ ⋅  is non-parametric, we could 
have directly used the co-variates ESU  and EF   in the model (2). The logarithm does, 
therefore, not impose any model specification here. This variable transformation is only due 
to smoothing necessities, see Section 3.2. 
As we analyze here the subvention policy, for a fair evaluation we have to choose the same 
measure which the European Community applies, i.e. Livestock Units per Agricultural 
Utilized Area, i.e. LU/UAA (see discussion in the introduction). The LU/UAA indicator is 
an indicator highly related to other environmental amenities of the farm such us untouched 
landscape, traditional buildings, wild animal habitats, bio-diversity, preservation of the 
regional non intensive productive (endemic) livestock types, and shows the potential of 
grazing feed of the livestock, usually negative related to feedstuff consumption. Under the 
current CAP regulation (since year 1993) the farms must present a minimum LU/UAA to 
qualify for DP. For that reason some farms in our sample show no DP, but it could also 
happen that the farm does not have subsidies for other reasons (or some products do not 
have DP specific programs but some farms can be engaged in other environmental 
programs that provide subsidies to improve environmental behavior in that case DP are 
included). Table 1 gives the DP distribution by type of animal and country. 
Note that the smaller EF is, the more “environmentally friendly” the farm is. Note further 
that defining EF by LU/(land value) does not change the overall final results. 
All variables are taken from FADN, except land prices which come from the Agricultural 
Land Prices Survey for Spain (Encuesta de precios de la Tierra (Base 1997), Boletin 
Mensual de Estadistica Agraria, November 2002). For Germany we use land rents derived 
from the rental prices of rented land; in cases of missing values we have used the regional 
average derived from the underlying sample. 
We selected farms oriented to livestock production, i.e. farms with larger animal than crop 
output in both years. To include only farms with similar production functions and with the 
possibility of cropping vegetal products for re-use on the farm or for sale, we selected only 
farms with both positive animal and crop production. We believe that farms without land 
have a non-comparable production function and will therefore be excluded, e.g. think of 
fattering farms. 
For our analysis, the sample is split by country (Germany and Spain), and by type of 
livestock farming (cattle farming, pig farming and sheep and goats) as these different farm 
types are neither uniform in the treatment by CAP nor in the production process. So we did 
all calculations separately for each year, country and farm type. As mentioned earlier, for 
comparison reasons we will determine an efficiency index with [ DPE ] and without [ WE ] 
direct payments. 
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We use data from the sample in Spain and Germany (years 1999--2000) of the FADN. 
Every year, the survey8 gathers information on the characteristics of the farm (UAA, LU, 
type of livestock and crops, economic size of the farm, ...) and nominal production (animal 
and crop output) for a representative sample of holdings at the regional level in Germany 
and Spain. Unfortunately, for Germany, information on sheep and goats is only available 
for very few farms, thus a statistical analysis is not sensible. 
 
The same FADN survey also provides detailed information on input expenditures by farm. 
As mentioned above, for the selected farms, the livestock production is always greater than 
crop output (fodder, field crop, grain cereals, vineyards, potatoes, industrial crops, plants, 
fruits, dried pulses, olive groves and others). Table 2 summarizes the number of farms that 
are used for all the calculations, separated by year, animal type and country.  
 
 T 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The variation in the number of available farms in Tables 1 and 2 is originated by the voluntary 
character of the data provided by the farmers. 
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3. Methodologies 
 
Even though these methodologies are not completely new, many readers might not be 
familiar with DEA or with nonparametric regression. Therefore we offer here a brief insight 
for a better understanding and interpretation of the results presented later. 
 
 
3.1. Estimation of Efficiency 
 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric approach using linear programming 
methods to determine the envelopment of the DMUs (decision making units) thus 
identifying “the best practice” for each productive unit. 
Then, measures are calculated relative to this frontier for each individual Debreu-Farrell 
efficiency (see Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000), for a comprehensive description of the 
methodology). The main advantage of DEA is that there is no need to specify a particular 
functional form for the production frontier, though the assumption that there is no random 
error might be seen as a drawback. However, excluding measurement errors, this question 
depends only on the definition of “efficiency”. 
Let us define some basic concepts of non-parametric efficiency measurement. Let  px∈ℜ   
and  qy +∈ℜ   denote input and output vectors, respectively, with which we may define the 
following set of the feasible input-output combination,  
p q{(x, y) : x can produce y}. (3)+Ψ = ∈ℜ  
 For any  qy +∈ℜ   we may define the previous set by the input requirement set defined as  
pX(y) {x : (x, y) }, (4)= ∈ℜ ∈Ψ  
 where the input efficient frontier may be defined by the following isoquant:  
X(y) {x X(y) : x X(y) 1}, (5)δ θ θ= ∈ ∉ ∀ <  
 and therefore, the corresponding Farrell input-oriented measure of efficiency (Farrell, 
1957) is specified as the following distance function9:  
(x, y) inf{ : x X(y)}. (6)θ θ θ= ∈  
 So  (x, y)θ   defines the input efficiency (the maximum contraction) along a fixed ray away 
from the efficient input. E.g. a value of  (x, y) 1θ =   means that the producer is input efficient 
while a value of  (x, y) 1θ <   indicates that the producer is input inefficient and he may 
reduce inputs in that proportion while maintaining the output level. 
Alternatively, one could formulate (5) to (7) as an output oriented problem. In practice, the 
                                                 
9Equivalently, Farrell's input efficiency may be described by the Shephard input distance function  
1 x(x, y) ( (x, y)) sup{ | X(y)}δ θ δ δ
−= = ∈  
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input orientated is more popular due to its easier interpretation. However, in particular if we 
would include DP as output instead of SP = -DP as input, an output orientated DEA version 
would be more intuitive as a farmer is interested in maximizing the direct subsidies 
received. But maximizing DP and minimizing SP is the same, and similar problems we 
could discuss for many of the other inputs when choosing an output orientated DEA. 
Nevertheless, we repeated some of the calculations with the output orientated DEA, that 
certainly suffers to some extend similar criticism as the input orientated one. In the 
Appendix we give for the Spanish data histogram plots of the  DPE   and  WE   for 1999 and 
2000 when the indices are calculated with an input orientated DEA, and histograms of the 
differences of the input minus the output orientated  DPE  . As can be seen, the differences 
are minor (but for pig farms an output orientated DEA even discriminates the farms 
somewhat more). Not surprisingly, the final conclusions turn out to be the same. 
Further alternatives are e.g. DEA-methodologies that allow combining both minimizing 
input and maximizing output, see González Fidalgo (2001) or Banker, Cooper, Seiford, and 
Zhu (2004). On the other hand these method also needs several assumptions that not 
necessarily meet in our context as for example in González Fidalgo (2001) minimizing 
input and maximizing output is restricted to occur always in the same proportion. Finally, 
DEA also allows for fixing some of the input, respectively output factors, see Banker and 
Morey (1986), but we found this does not fit to our case because all input factors can be 
potentially changed by the farmer's decision, e.g. additional land could be rented. 
Finally, some readers may be puzzled about the counterfactual exercise including 
respectively excluding SP in DEA. First, note that we just calculates two different convex 
hulls under the status quo allocation, DEA is not a regression problem. Second, compare 
our treatment of SP also with Seiford and Zhu (2002)’s treatment of undesirable inputs / 
outputs under the assumption that classification of DEA efficiencies and inefficiencies are 
invariant to data transformations. Third, our key argument is that in our counterfactual 
exercise we really want to compare how farms do economically under the status quo 
allocation (and thus their present environmental friendliness) with versus without DP. 
For the rest of the paper we therefore concentrate on the presentation of the numerical 
results based on the input orientated DEA. The estimation of this, above defined concept 
requires some assumptions (see Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell, 1994) for both the production 
possibility set (mainly convexity and free disposability of inputs and outputs) and the 
distance function. The first model proposed under the methodology called DEA (Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) was defined under constant returns to scale, but later papers 
have considered alternative sets of assumptions such the case of variable returns to scale by 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). In any case, and under some regularity assumptions 
on the data generating process specified in Kneip, Park and Simar (1998), DEA allows 
consistent estimation of the above concepts (see Simar and Wilson (2000) for a review of 
the DEA statistical properties). 
For a sample of  n   producers, the DEA estimate of the production set ( Ψˆ ) under the least 
restrictive returns to scale assumption (i.e. variable returns) is:  
n n n
p q
i i i i i i
i 1 i 1 i 1
ˆ {(x, y) : x x , y y , 1, 0}, (8)γ γ γ γ+
= = =
Ψ = ∈ℜ ≥ ≤ = ∀ ≥∑ ∑ ∑  
 where  iγ   is the intensity vector of firm  i   and defines its best practice or benchmark 
firm by a linear combination of all the firms observed in the sample. Constraint  ni 1 i 1γ= =∑   
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imposes variable returns to scale into the benchmark technology while the two first 
constraints in the equation (8) imply that an excess of outputs or inputs can be disposed of 
freely. 
The DEA estimates of equations (4) and (5) are then  
 
pˆ ˆX(y) {x | (x, y) }, (9)= ∈ℜ ∈Ψ  
  
ˆ ˆ ˆX(y) {x X(y) | x X(y) , 1}, (10)δ θ θ= ∈ ∉ ∀ <  
 
 while the estimation of the Farrell (technical) efficiency measure, see Farrell (1957), is 
computed by linear programming techniques as follows:  
n n n
j j i i j j i i i i
i 1 i 1 i 1
ˆ(x , y ) min{ : x x , y y , 1, 0}. (11)θ θ γ θ γ γ γ
= = =
= ≤ ≤ = ∀ ≥∑ ∑ ∑  
 
 Since by construction ψˆ ψ⊆ , the estimator j jˆ(x , y )θ  constitutes a downward-biased 
estimator of  j j(x , y )θ . The analyzed firm j   is technically efficient if and only if  j jˆ(x , y ) 1θ =   
and it is placed on the estimated frontier while a value such as  j jˆ(x , y ) 1θ <   means that the 
firm is inefficient. 
We conclude with three remarks that can now be understood better: 
 
As animal and crop outputs cannot be easily substituted, we must not aggregate them, 
instead, we consider the calculation of efficiency as a two dimensional output problem. 
As already indicated above, including SP, representing the costs paid for not producing in a 
subsidized manner can also be understood as including direct payments as negative inputs. 
There are two reasons why we preferred not to consider them as a third output: on the one 
hand, the production factors considered here do not (directly) produce DP, so there is no 
reasonable argument for allowing them to appear on the left hand side of the production 
function; on the other hand, many farms in Spain have zero subsidies and would thus form 
a non-interpretable hyper-plane in the DEA. Nevertheless we admit that handling DP in the 
model as input subsidy or output related subsidy is a crucial point; both approaches could 
be applied. The “Global Trade Analysis Project” (known as GTAP), for example, handles 
DP as subsidies on inputs. The main part of DP in the EU is linked to land (even headage 
premia on beef cattle are linked via livestock density restrictions). Therefore it seems 
worthwhile to handle DP as input subsidy. For the other option (handling DP as output), DP 
level could increase for a constant level on inputs (e.g. land), which is contradictory to CAP 
regulations. 
 
Finally, it could be argued as to whether more input variables should be aggregated for a 
non-parametric analysis such as DEA, e.g. to obtain stronger results with respect to larger 
differences in the resulting efficiency index. However, this question is nothing more than a 
discussion of the bias-variance trade off dilemma: more aggregating leads to more bias but 
less variance and vice versa. We have decided here to opt for high resolution, i.e. high 
variance, small bias. So, since we always conduct non-parametric analysis with high 
resolution level, none of our results will suffer errors due to possible misspecification. 
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3.2. Regression Analysis 
 
 
Next, we are interested in estimating model (2). As mentioned above we do not want to 
assume any particular functional form on g( , )⋅ ⋅   except that it is a smooth function, i.e. it 
has continuous second derivatives. 
We will now present a brief insight into the algorithms of non-parametric flexible function 
regression. In particular we explain the estimation of the parameters  β   and its asymptotic 
covariance, as well as the estimation of the non-parametric function of  g( , )⋅ ⋅   in a 
semiparametric model of the form as described in equation (2). We assume  
E[e | EF, ESU, R] 0=  ,  Var[e] < ∞  . The estimation of  g( )⋅   and  β   will be made in two steps: 
first the estimation of β  and its covariance using the method of Robinson (1988), and 
afterwards the estimation of g( , )⋅ ⋅  using local linear smoothing by Ruppert and Wand 
(1994). For a more detailed introduction to non- and semi-parametric modeling see also 
Härdle, Müller, Sperlich, and Werwatz (2004). 
The basic idea is to construct an estimator that creates a smooth surface (or hyper-plane), 
e.g. in the one dimensional case a smooth line, into the point cloud that presents its 
functional form. The smoothness of that surface can be (pre-) determined by choosing a 
respectively large smoothing parameter  h  , called bandwidth. Actually, this parameter 
can often also be data driven. 
First, it is important to understand that this estimator works locally, e.g. we estimate the 
desired function, the hyper-plane, separately at each point we are interested in. Therefore 
we need to introduce some additional notations. Consider for a moment a regression 
problem of the form 0 0E[Y | X x ] G(x )= = , Y∈ℜ , dX, x∈ℜ  with  dG( ) :⋅ ℜ →ℜ  being an 
unknown smoothing function. Imagine we aim to estimate  0G(x )   for some point  d0x ∈ℜ  . 
Having  ni i i 1{X , Y } =   observed, this can be done by local least squares:  
 
G (x0) 
0G(x )∇  
{ }
0 1
2n
T
0 1 0 0i i h i
i 1a ,a
Y a a (X x ) K (X x ), (12)arg min
=
= − − − −∑
 
      
 
  0a ∈ℜ  ,  d1a ∈ℜ   and  G( )∇ ⋅   being the gradient of  G( )⋅  . Further,  jvd 1j 1h h hK (v) K( )== ∏   is a  
dℜ →ℜ  weight function. In our calculations we chose  2 21516K(v) (1 v ) 11{| v | 1}= − ≤  . So we 
used a weighted least squares estimator for linear regression that becomes a local (linear) 
estimator due to the weights hK  giving a lot of weight to points i i(X , Y )  where iX   is close 
to 0x  but zero weights to points far from 0x . Consistency, asymptotic theory and properties 
are well known and studied for the multivariate case in Ruppert and Wand (1994), for a 
general introduction see Fan and Gijbels (1996). 
If we eliminate in equation (12) the vector 1a and thus maximize only over 0a , the 
minimizing argument is a local constant estimator of  0G(x ) . In this case it is easy to give 
the explicit formula:  
n
i 1 h i 0 i
0 n
i 1 h i 0
K (X x )Y
G(x ) . (13)
K (X x )
=
=
−∑= −∑
%  
 As one can see, in the weighting function, the smoothing parameter  h  comes in: the larger 
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the h , and consequently the environment with positive weighting, the smoother the 
resulting hyper-plane, i.e.  h →∞   gives a linear function for G  whereas  h 0=   yields a  G   
being the interpolation of the  iY  's. In a context like ours, the choice of the smoothing 
parameter should be considered in the same way as choice of degrees of freedom, i.e. the 
empirical researcher would allow for more flexibility or impose more smoothness on its 
functions. To allow for high flexibility without increasing the variance to unreasonable 
levels, we chose smoothing parameters that did not restrict the functional forms unless the 
plotted surface became wiggly. 
Returning back to our model (2), we will apply the local linear estimation method, i.e. 
equation (12), on ni i i i i i 1ˆ{W : (ln(EF ), ln(ESU )), (E R )}β == − . The remaining question is how to 
obtain  βˆ  . The estimator of  β   is defined as  
1
R R,R R R R,E E (14)
ˆ S Sβ − − − − −= % % % %  
 where for any matrix or vector sequences iR  , iB  we set Tn1 i 1R, B i inS R B== ∑   and  
)
i i iR E[R | W ]=% , 
)
i i iB E[B | W ]=%   with  iB   being either  iR   or  iE . We estimate the conditional expectations 
(
)
E ) via local constant smoother as defined in the equation (13). It is easy to see that the 
variance of  βˆ   can be estimated by  2 1R R,R Rˆ Sσ − − −% %  with  2σˆ   being a consistent estimator of 
the conditional variance of  E : 2 i iVar[E | W , R ]σ = . For more details see Robinson (1988). 
Note that all these models have been proved to work perfectly also for dependent data. It is 
worthwhile to mention this as the indices calculated by DEA are not independent. 
Certainly, as  g( , )⋅ ⋅   is non-parametric, we could have directly used the co-variates  ESU   
and  EF   in the model (2). As mentioned above, the logarithm does therefore not impose 
any model specification here. The problem is that both variables have a rather skewed 
distribution with many data-sparse areas. In contrast,  ln(ESU)   as well as  ln(EF)   look quite 
normal around the mode with rather short tails at the end. It is thus only for the sake of 
reasonable behavior of our smoothing techniques that we prefer to apply our smoothing 
methods on the log-transformed data, see also Biedermann and Dette (2003) for more 
details. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
All above mentioned calculations have been realized separately for Spain for 1999, 2000 
for cattle, pig, sheep and goat farms; for Germany for 1999, 2000 for cattle and pig farms. 
The presentation and discussion of results follows the reasoning and list of questions given 
in the first section. This includes: estimation of our models in equation (2) to analyze the 
impact of environmentally friendly behavior and farm size on efficiency for 1999 and 2000; 
comparison of regression results based on  WE   with those based on  DPE ; calculating the 
correlations between subsidies and other factors such as farm economic size, 
environmentally friendly behavior and economic efficiency; where appropriate, we use and 
compare results of both calculations for further conclusions. 
As the calculation of efficiency alone is not of interest in this article, but only an auxiliary 
step (see first section), we will neither explicitly give nor discuss the results of the DEA 
calculations here but have deferred them to the Appendix. Instead, we start directly with the 
analysis of the impact of environmentally friendly behavior and farm size on efficiency. 
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That is, we focus on the regression problem of equation  
TE g[ln(EF), ln(ESU)] R e ,β= + +  
 for  E  being  DPE  ( DP  included in model) as well as for  E  being  WE  ( DP   not included in 
model). By comparing efficiency calculated with direct payments included ( DPE ) and the 
resulting efficiency when subsidies are ignored ( WE ), we checked if and how the CAP 
policy distorts efficiency. The estimation procedures applied here have been explained in 
detail in Section 3.2. When we speak of significance in the following, we always refer to 
the  10%   significance level. 
In non- and semi-parametric regression, the choice of smoothness controlled via the 
bandwidth (named  h   in Section 3.2.) and chosen by the empirical researcher, is often 
either not discussed or quite polemic. Therefore, we tried out several bandwidths and 
present here the results for those where the estimated surface starts to become smooth. In 
practice, for two dimensions and smooth densities as we have in this application, this 
provides a reasonable trade-off between bias and variance of the estimates. For the 
parametric part  β   of model (2) it should be emphasized that the results for the (semi-) 
parametric estimation of the regional dummies turned out to be quite robust with respect to 
the bandwidth choice for the non-parametric part. This is expected if e.g. the regional 
dummies are almost uncorrelated with the other covariates  ln (ESU)   and  ln (EF)  . 
First let us make some remarks on the results concerning the regional dummies, i.e. on  βˆ  , 
summarized in Table 3 for Spain in 1999 and 2000. We divided Spain into 5 regions: 
North, Center, Andalusia, Ebro (along the Ebro river), and Levante. The last one has been 
used as a normalizing region. Note that Andalusia could be replaced by “South”, and 
Levante by “East”. Ebro represents the northeastern Spanish region including the 
northeastern Mediterranean coast and the Ebro river valley with a mainly Mediterranean 
climate that traditionally has been considered as a homogenous agricultural region. 
 
Surprisingly, the North and Ebro seem to be less efficient. However, these results are only 
significant for cattle farming, whereas the Ebro is only significantly less efficient than the 
other regions when considering sheep and goats. For cattle farming, Levante seems to be 
best even though not significantly better than the center and the south. These findings 
hardly change with the dependent variable, being  DPE   and its counterfactual opposite  WE  . 
In Table 4 the corresponding results for Germany are given, also for 1999 and 2000, but 
without sheep and goat farms. We divided Germany in to four regions: North, Center, 
South, and East. Again, the latter has been used as a normalizing region. 
 
In Germany, the south is the most efficient in cattle farming whereas it is hard to say 
something about differences in the rest of the country. It may be that central Germany is 
more efficient than the east and north, but this is not significant for 2000. In pig farming, 
the most efficient farms are the (quite large) ones in Eastern Germany. However, there are 
significant changes with year and the dependent variable,  DPE   or  WE  . 
Much more interesting is the outcome of the impact estimates for environmentally friendly 
behavior ( EF ) and farm size ( ESU ) on (conventional) efficiency. As the functional form of  
g( , )⋅ ⋅   in model (2) is non-parametric, the results are given graphically, see Figures 1 to 10. 
Here, only the graphs for 2000 are shown, the graphs for 1999 are available on page  
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www.uc3m.es/uc3m/dpto/CJM/webmonnet.html or upon request. 
 
In all the graphs shown, the outer  2%   boundaries are cut off (i.e. not plotted) to avoid 
interpreting the so called boundary effects typical in nonparametric estimation. Since the  
g( , )⋅ ⋅   function is an unknown function from  2ℜ   to  ℜ  , it is presented via two graphs: a 
three dimensional and a two dimensional one. The two dimensional one shows three 
functions representing the three slices of the full (i.e. three) dimensional plot that describe 
the impact of the environmentally friendly behavior proxy  ln(EF) ) on efficiency when farm 
size ( ln (ESU)  ) is fixed at: the median (solid line), the upper  95%   quantile, i.e. large farms 
(dotted line), and at the lower  5%   quantile, i.e. small farms (dashed line). 
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Our results show that: 
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In general one can say that the distortion of efficiency caused by direct subsidies is visible 
in our plots for Spain and Germany, especially for pig farms (see below). 
 
The less environmentally friendly farms are generally more efficient in terms of the actual 
price structure. This holds regardless of whether direct subsidies are included in the 
calculation of efficiency or not. Generally, efficiency (for both,  DPE  and WE ) increases 
when livestock units per agricultural utilized area increase (under the actual price structure 
of inputs and outputs). Environmentally friendly pig farms are the exception. When we 
include direct payments (i.e. consider DPE ) they indeed show a high level of efficiency.  
 19
 
 
These findings are especially strong in the medium and small holdings, in particular in 
Germany, but can also be found in Spain. 
Positive externalities justify the introduction of subsidies to reward nature conservation. 
The target of helping to preserve the environment and increase efficiency was introduced 
by the MacSharry reform of the CAP by linking subsidies to environmentally friendly 
farms. This reform of the CAP in 1992, (in force since 1993), yields some visible effects, 
especially in the sector of pig farming. 
The efficiency level of the more environmentally friendly pig farms is much higher than 
those of the conventional hog holdings, i.e. intensive ones, when focusing on  DPE , again, 
especially in Germany. It is rather interesting to note that they lose their efficiency 
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advantage compared to the less environmentally adapted farms when we recalculate 
efficiency under the counterfactual hypothesis of no direct payments. In other words, it is 
pretty clear that the most environmentally friendly pig farms are efficient thanks to direct 
payments of the European Community 
 
Conversely, in cattle farming, the conventional holdings are more efficient than those most 
adapted to the environment. In this sector, the results hold true with and without direct 
payments, i.e. independently of whether looking at  DPE   or  WE . This also holds for both 
countries, Germany and Spain. 
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However, in Germany, the discrepancy in efficiency between intensive and extensive 
animal farming becomes less important when subsidies are taken into account, whereas in 
Spain we cannot find any effect of the subsidies with respect to environmental friendliness 
in the cattle sector. Our results seem to indicate that to some extent (and certain in 
Germany) there is a positive distortion caused by subsidies for environmental friendliness. 
Moreover, we found empirical evidence that the current direct payments system is 
“environmentally oriented” in all types of farms studied in Germany but only for pig 
farming in Spain, (see Tables 5 to 9). Taken together, this information offers the conclusion 
that the present direct subsidy structure plays a significant role in helping farms to preserve 
the natural environment under competitive conditions. Additionally, the new CAP MTR 
could improve the efficiency of the environmentally friendly farm by increasing the 
incentives for agri-environmental measures. 
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To further investigate this point we directly calculated different correlations between 
subsidies and  EF   and tested them for significance, see Tables 5 to 9. These results show a 
significant positive correlation of the direct subsidies and the proxy of adaptation to the 
natural environment, i.e. direct payment negatively correlated with LU/UAA, for both 
countries and years over all models considered. 
 
All figures indicate clearly that economic size matters for  efficiency performance. Usually, 
one would expect that larger farms outperform the smaller ones, but we found several 
exceptions. Particularly, the smaller pig farms perform rather well and are competitive as 
well. 
 
Also the counterfactual exercise (looking on  WE ) without subsides supports these results 
both in Germany and Spain. We cannot make such a clear statement for cattle farming. 
Nevertheless, in Spain the small cattle farms are above the mean efficiency index. The 
counterfactual study without direct subsidies upholds these result. This finding is 
interesting since this result fits perfectly with the conclusions of Álvarez and Arias (2003), 
who pointed out that increasing cattle farm size while holding managerial ability constant 
can be an important source for diseconomies of size. 
 
In general the biggest farms reach the highest levels of efficiency for all animal types. This 
result also holds true in the counterfactual exercise, except for German pig farming. It is 
important to add here that the size impact on efficiency often interacts with the 
environmental behavior, and that this impact (i.e. the one of  ln(EF) ) on efficiency is often 
much stronger than the size effect. The counterfactual does not seems to have an impact on 
the efficiency of the small farms versus the medium farm. 
German pig farming is an interesting case because the small environmentally friendly farms 
become more efficient than the biggest farm when we account for direct payments. But this 
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is not the case in either German cattle farming or for any type of animal farm in Spain. 
There, direct payments do not seem to positively discriminate (helping to raise relative 
efficiency) by size and adaptation to natural environment. Again, especially for pig farming 
in Spain, small intensive farms seem to be above the mean efficiency index and above the 
biggest farms. The counterfactual ignoring the subsidies when calculating the efficiency 
upholds these results as well. This was a remarkable difference in the results of German pig 
farming, where the direct payments made the environmentally friendly farms more efficient 
in comparison with the more conventional farms (intensive). In Germany, the direct 
payment unambiguously increases the efficiency of environmentally friendly farms when 
compared with conventional (intensive) ones, which is not the case in Spain. 
We finally address the question of which factors the subsidies are correlated to and how 
strongly. As we are interested in both absolute and relative mean increases, we calculated 
all the following correlations and their  p values−  :  
 
W W DP DP
corr(DP,EF), corr(DP,ln(EF)), corr(ln(1 DP),ln(EF)),corr(ln(1 DP),EF)
corr(DP,ESU), corr(DP,ln(ESU)),
corr(ln(1 DP),ln(ESU)), corr(ln(1 DP),ESU)
corr(DP,E ), corr(ln(1 DP),E ), corr(DP,E ), corr(ln(1 DP),E )
+ +
+ +
+ +
 
  
It is clear that when efficiency is calculated including DP , DPE  will be (positively) 
correlated with it; the result can change when looking on  ln(1 DP)+ . Further, we expect that 
the subsidies for each year are highly correlated with those of the last year. This means that, 
when calculating  WE  , one has certainly not eliminated the effect of all subsidies paid to 
this farm, but only ignored the cash received this very year. So, in  WE   the long-term effect 
of (former received or not received) direct payments is still reflected. For this reason it is 
clear that we are more interested in W Wcorr(DP,E ),corr(ln(1 DP),E )+   than in  
DP DPcorr(DP,E ),corr(ln(1 DP),E )+  . 
Again, first we give the results for Spain for 1999 and 2000, drawn in Table 5 to Table 7. 
First, let us briefly summarize the signs we see in the tables: In both years, 1999 and 2000, 
signs are always negative for any correlation considered between  DP   and  EF   for Spain 
as well as for Germany. This means that, as mentioned above, environmentally friendly 
behavior is indeed supported financially by the European Community (recall that the 
smaller the  EF   the more environmentally friendly the farm is). For both countries and 
years all correlations considered between  DP   and  ESU   are positive. This means that 
large farms generally get more financial support than small ones. Looking at the pair  
Wcorr(DP,E )  ,  Wcorr(ln(1 DP),E )+   we get the following schema for both years 
 
   cattle    pig   sheep and goats 
Spain  +  +  -  - +  - 
Germany  +  - +  0  
 
Now let us come to a more detailed analysis of the results: 
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Looking only at the absolute values of the calculated correlation coefficients, it seems 
evident (compare the p-values of the significance tests) that the distortion of efficiency 
caused by direct subsidies is significant in Spain and Germany. But do not forget that here 
we are not correcting for endogeneity. That is why we had to do the regression analysis 
with the counterfactual exercise. 
Direct payment correlation with farm size shows the level of real inverse modulation of the 
actual CAP subsidies. In Germany and Spain we found a clear positive correlation between 
subsidies and farm size. Our results are not surprising in the sense that some DP are directly 
related to “size”, e.g. payments per animal. However, they are definitely surprising when 
we compare the official political intention with the high level of correlation. Often, the 
correlation between DP and size is higher than 90%  , i.e. subsidies can mainly be explained 
by farm size. Moreover, results are independent of farm type, country or the year in which 
they are tested. These results are congruent with the generally believed hypothesis that all 
direct subsidies are (indirectly) linked mostly to output level and size. 
 
Looking at the correlations between DPE  and DP , the results are, as expected, all positive or 
zero except DPcorr(ln(1 DP),E )+  for pig farming in Spain. There is certainly no doubt that 
when direct payment enters as positive output or negative input of a farm, then farms 
obtaining those payments seem to be efficient. Looking at the p-values this is significant for 
most cases in both countries and years. The hypothesis that subsidies really increase 
economic efficiency has to be examined by comparing the real efficiency DEA index with 
counterfactual efficiencies under the hypothesis of not having received subsidies in the 
particular year. 
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Then, in this more interesting counterfactual exercise, our results show that the level of 
efficiency on average increases with the units of direct payments as well. This again with 
the exception of Spanish pig farms. However, looking at a percentage increase of direct 
payment, i.e. on Wcorr(ln(1 DP),E )+ , efficiency decreases or stagnates for all years and 
countries except for Spanish cattle farms. In other words, focusing on the efficiency, a 
policy which grants subsidies per farm (decoupled of size) seems much more reasonable 
than the current, and thus counterproductive, policy of giving subsidies mainly based on 
size. This is also one of the key points in the recommendation list of Bertola et al. (2002), 
reinforced by our empirical results. In fact a subsidy per agricultural worker is less 
discriminatory than the actual system (see Mora and San Juan, 2004). 
As indicated above, when we interpreted the graph's outcomes, the results show significant 
positive correlation between the direct subsidies and the proxy of adaptation to the natural 
environment, e.g. direct payments correlated negatively with LU/UAA. That is, we found 
an overall significant decreasing level of direct payments as the livestock units per 
agricultural utilized area increased in all farm types. So the subsidy policy takes 
environmental friendliness into account. However, it is evident from the tables that this 
correlation is much weaker, almost negligible compared to the overwhelmingly strong 
correlation between subsidies and farm size. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The main empirical conclusions are the following.  
 
Looking at conventional efficiency ( WE ), large farms with intensive holdings are generally 
more efficient. Direct payments are a potential source of efficiency distortions. In fact, the 
amount of direct payment growth after the CAP reform of 1992 significantly affects the 
relative level of efficiency DPE . The results show a positive correlation between subsidies 
and efficiency (both WE  and DPE ) when looking at the absolute amounts. However, the 
mean efficiency decreases or stagnates as the percentage of direct payments rises. This 
holds for all type of farms, years and countries analyzed except for Spanish cattle farms. 
This means that a combination of direct subsidies and size is counterproductive. 
Unfortunately, our results show clearly that this is what the present subvention policy is 
doing: farm size explains about 90% (or more) of the direct payments. 
The strong subsidization of large farms cannot be justified with their presumably high 
efficiency or environmental friendliness. Neither our graphical nor our numerical results 
confirm, or even contradict, such a hypothesis. 
 
The direct subsidies have been justified as a reward for the positive externalities that the 
agricultural activities generate. We have found that the current direct payment system is not 
sufficient to correct the fact that the less environmentally friendly farms are the most 
efficient ones. The only exception we found was German pig farming in which the 
efficiency of the most environmentally friendly farms normally rises strongly with direct 
payments versus the counterfactual exercise. This effect is more important in Germany, 
where conventional farms become less efficient than the environmentally friendly farms 
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after receiving direct payments. In Spain, the most conventional (intensive) Spanish hog 
holdings reach efficiency levels “similar” to the environmentally friendly farms when 
accounting for direct payments (or vice versa). But the smallest and less environmentally 
adapted farms are most efficient. Given that the CAP regulations are common for the whole 
EU, we guess that the differences in the environmental standards and their enforcements 
between Member States have lead finally to the observed differences between Germany and 
Spain. 
 
Nevertheless, together with the numerical results on correlations, we conclude that there is 
some empirical evidence that the actual direct payments system is “environmentally 
oriented” for all types of farms studied (decreasing level of direct payments as the livestock 
units per agricultural utilized area increases). Thus, our calculations show that the actual 
subsidy schedule plays a significant role in helping farmers to conserve the natural 
environment, even though we have seen throughout our data that while this policy succeeds 
in particular in Germany, it is still not sufficient to motivate farmers to change their 
production towards a more environmental friendly one. 
 
All this should encourage a look at what the EU is doing to change the actual situation (the 
cross-compliance target on the CAP reform 2003) in the future. 
 
 
6. Appendix 
 
All histograms shown here refer to the Spanish data. We first give the histogram plots for 
1999,  DPE   and  WE , followed by those for 2000. Note that these indices are calculated 
based on an input orientated DEA. Due to the high level of disaggregation, see discussion 
in the previous sections, we have in most cases the mode at 1 but little density close to 1. A 
further aggregation of inputs would make the histograms flatter on the right tail. Obviously, 
there are only marginal differences between 1999 and 2000. 
 
Finally, we give histograms for 1999 and 2000 of the differences in  EDP   when calculated 
by input orientated DEA minus those calculated by output orientated DEA (“orientation 
differences for  DPE  “). As expected, the differences have by far the most density close to 
zero. Together with the former plots ( DPE   in 1999 and 2000) we can already conclude that 
these small changes cannot affect the all over conclusions of our analysis. 
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